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Cloud computing is becoming a powerful network archi-
tecture to perform large-scale and complex computing.
In this paper, we will comprehensively survey the
concepts and architecture of cloud computing, as well
as its security and privacy issues. We will compare
different cloud models, trust/reputation models and
privacy-preservation schemes. Their pros and cons
are discussed for each cloud computing security and
architecture strategy.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is quickly becoming one of
themost popular and trendy phrases being tossed
around in today’s technology world. “It’s be-
coming the phrase du jour”, says Gartner’s Ben
Pring [1]. It is the big new idea that will
supposedly reshape the information technol-
ogy (IT) services landscape. According to The
Economist in a 2008 article, it will have huge
impacts on the information technology industry,
and also profoundly change the way people use
computers [2]. What exactly is cloud comput-
ing then, and how will it have such a big impact
on people and the companies they work for?
In order to define cloud computing, it is first
necessary to explain what is referenced by the
phrase “The Cloud”. The first reference to
“The Cloud” originated from the telephone in-
dustry in the early 1990s, when Virtual Pri-
vate Network (VPN) service was first offered.
Rather than hard-wire data circuits between the
provider and customers, telephone companies
began using VPN-based services to transmit
data. This allowed providers to offer the same
amount of bandwidth at a lower cost by rerout-
ing network traffic in real-time to accommo-
date ever-changing network utilization. Thus,
it was not possible to accurately predict which
path data would take between the provider and
customer. As a result, the service provider’s
network responsibilities were represented by a
cloud symbol to symbolize the black box of
sorts from the end-users’ perspective. It is in
this sense that the term “cloud” in the phrase
cloud computing metaphorically refers to the
Internet and its underlying infrastructure.
Cloud computing is in many ways a conglom-
erate of several different computing technolo-
gies and concepts like grid computing, virtu-
alization, autonomic computing [40], Service-
oriented Architecture (SOA) [43], peer-to-peer
(P2P) computing [42], and ubiquitous comput-
ing [41]. As such, cloud computing has inher-
ited many of these technologies’ benefits and
drawbacks. One of the main driving forces
behind the development of cloud computing
was to fully harness the already existing, but
under-utilized computer resources in data cen-
ters. Cloud computing is, in a general sense,
on-demand utility computing for anyone with
access to the cloud. It offers a plethora of IT
services ranging from software to storage to
security, all available anytime, anywhere, and
from any device connected to the cloud. More
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formally, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as
a model for convenient, on-demand network ac-
cess to computing resources such as networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services that
can be quickly deployed and released with very
littlemanagement by the cloud-provider [4]. Al-
though the word “cloud” does refer to the In-
ternet in a broad sense, in reality, clouds can
be public, private, or hybrid (a combination of
both public and private clouds). Public clouds
provide IT services to anyone in the general pub-
lic with an Internet connection and are owned
and maintained by the company selling and dis-
tributing these services. In contrast, private
clouds provide IT services through a privately-
owned network to a limited number of people
within a specific organization.
As two examples of public consumer-level clouds
consider Yahoo! R©Mail and YouTube. Through
these two sites, users access data in the form
of e-mails, attachments, and videos from any
device that has an Internet connection. When
users download e-mails or upload videos, they
do not know where exactly the data came from
or went. Instead, they simply know that their
data is located somewhere inside the cloud. In
reality, cloud computing involves much more
complexity than the preceding two examples
illustrate and it is this behind the scenes com-
plexity that makes cloud computing so appeal-
ing and beneficial to individual consumers and
large businesses alike.
Cloud computing is an emerging technology
from which many different industries and in-
dividuals can greatly benefit. The concept is
simple; the cloud (internet) can be utilized to
provide services that would otherwise have to
be installed on a personal computer. For ex-
ample, service providers may sell a service
to customers which would provide storage of
customer information. Or perhaps a service
could allow customers to access and use some
software that would otherwise be very costly
in terms of money and memory. Typically,
cloud computing services are sold on an “as
needed” basis, thus giving customers more con-
trol than ever before. Cloud computing ser-
vices certainly have the potential to benefit both
providers and users. However, in order for cloud
computing to be practical and reliable, many ex-
isting issues must be resolved.
With ongoing advances in technology, the use of
cloud computing is certainly on the rise. Cloud
computing is a fairly recent technology that re-
lies on the internet to deliver services to paying
customers. Services that are most often used
with cloud computing include data storage and
accessing software applications (Figure 1). The
use of cloud computing is particularly appealing
to users for two reasons: it is rather inexpensive
and it is very convenient. Users can access data
or use applications with only a personal com-
puter and internet access. Another convenient
aspect of cloud computing is that software ap-
plications do not have to be installed on a user’s
computer, they can simply be accessed through
the internet. However, as with anything else
that seems too good to be true, there is one cen-
tral concern with the use of cloud computing
technology – security [44].
Figure 1. Cloud computing [5].
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In the internet, people like to use email for
communication because of its convenience, ef-
ficiency and reliability. It’s well known that
most of the contexts have no special meaning,
which means it’s more likely our daily com-
munication. So, such context is less attractive
for the hacker. However, when two people or
two groups, even two countries, want to com-
municate using the internet secretly, for each
communication partners they need some kind
of encryption to ensure their privacy and confi-
dentiality. For sake of that such situation occurs
rarely, users don’t want to make their processor
slower by encrypting the email or other docu-
ments. There must be a way for the users to
easily encrypt their document only when they
require such service.
In the rest of the paper, we will first survey
typical architectures from networks layers view-
point. Then we will discuss cloud models. Next
we move to security issues such as encryption-
on-demand. The privacy preservation models
will be described. In each part where multiple
schemes are presented, we will also compare
their pros and cons.
2. Cloud Computing Architecture
2.1. Abstract Layers
To begin understanding cloud computing in
some sort of detail, it is necessary to examine
it in abstraction layers beginning at the bottom
and working upwards. Figure 2 illustrates the
five layers that constitute cloud computing [44].
A particular layer is classified above another if
that layer’s services can be composed of ser-
vices provided by the layer beneath it.
Figure 2. The five abstraction layers of cloud
computing [5].
The bottom layer is the physical hardware, namely
the cloud-provider owned servers and switches
that serve as the cloud’s backbone. Customers
who use this layer of the cloud are usually big
corporations who require an extremely large
amount of subleased Hardware as a Service
(HaaS). As a result, the cloud-provider runs,
oversees, and upgrades its subleased hardware
for its customers. Cloud-providers must over-
comemany issues related to the efficient, smooth,
and quick allocation of HaaS to their customers,
and one solution that allows providers to ad-
dress some of these issues involves using re-
mote scriptable boot-loaders. Remote script-
able boot-loaders allow the cloud-provider to
specify the initial set of operations executed by
the servers during the boot process, meaning
that complete stacks of software can be quickly
implemented by remotely located data center
servers.
The next layer consists of the cloud’s software
kernel. This layer acts as a bridge between
the data processing performed in the cloud’s
hardware layer and the software infrastructure
layer which operates the hardware. It is the
lowest level of abstraction implemented by the
cloud’s software and its main job is to man-
age the server’s hardware resources while at the
same time allowing other programs to run and
utilize these same resources. Several different
implementations of software kernels include op-
erating system (OS) kernels, hypervisors, and
clustering middleware. Hypervisors allow mul-
tiple OSs to be run on servers at the same time,
while clustering middleware consists of soft-
ware located on groups of servers, which allows
multiple processes running on one or multiple
servers to interact with one another as if all were
concurrently operating on a single server.
The abstraction layer above the software kernel
is called software infrastructure. This layer ren-
ders basic network resources to the two layers
above it in order to facilitate new cloud soft-
ware environments and applications that can
be delivered to end-users in the form of IT
services. The services offered in the soft-
ware infrastructure layer can be separated into
three different subcategories: computational
resources, data storage, and communication.
Computational resources, also called Infras-
tructure as a Service (IaaS), are available to
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cloud customers in the form of virtual machines
(VMs). Virtualization technologies such as
para-virtualization [44], hardware-assisted vir-
tualization, live-migration, and pause-resume
enable a single, large server to act as multi-
ple virtual servers, or VMs, in order to better
utilize limited and costly hardware resources
such as its central processing unit (CPU) and
memory. Thus, each discrete server appears
to cloud users as multiple virtual servers ready
to execute the users’ software stacks. Through
virtualization, the cloud-providerwho owns and
maintains a large number of servers is able to
benefit from gains in resource utilization and
efficiency and claim the economies of scale that
arise as a result. IaaS also automatically al-
locates network resources among the various
virtual servers rapidly and transparently. The
resource utilization benefits provided by virtu-
alization would be almost entirely negated if
not for the layer’s ability to allocate servers’
resources in real-time. This gives the cloud-
provider the ability to dynamically redistribute
processing power in order to supply users with
the amount of computing resources they re-
quire without making any changes to the phys-
ical infrastructure of their data centers. Several
current examples of clouds that offer flexible
amounts of computational resources to its cus-
tomers include the Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) [9], Enomaly’s Elastic Computing
Platform (ECP) [10], and RESERVOIR archi-
tecture [6]. Data storage, which is also referred
to as Data-Storage as a Service (DaaS), allows
users of a cloud to store their data on servers lo-
cated in remote locations and have instant access
to their information from any site that has an In-
ternet connection. This technology allows soft-
ware platforms and applications to extend be-
yond the physical servers on which they reside.
Data storage is evaluated based on standards re-
lated to categories like performance, scalability,
reliability, and accessibility. These standards
are not all able to be achieved at the same time
and cloud-providers must choose which design
criteria they will focus on when creating their
data storage system. RESERVOIR architecture
allows providers of cloud infrastructure to dy-
namically partner with each other to create a
seemingly infinite pool of IT resources while
fully preserving the autonomy of technologi-
cal and business management decisions [6].In
the RESERVOIR architecture, each infrastruc-
ture provider is an autonomous business with its
own business goals. A provider federates with
other providers (i.e., other RESERVOIR sites)
based on its own local preferences. The IT man-
agement at a specific RESERVOIR site is fully
autonomous and governed by policies that are
aligned with the site’s business goals. To opti-
mize this alignment, once initially provisioned,
resources composing a service may be moved
to other RESERVOIR sites based on economi-
cal, performance, or availability considerations.
Our research addresses those issues and seeks
to minimize the barriers to delivering services
as utilities with guaranteed levels of service and
proper risk mitigation.
Two examples of data storage systems are Ama-
zon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) [11]
and Zecter ZumoDrive [12]. The communi-
cation subcategory of the software infrastruc-
ture layer, dubbed Communication as a Service
(CaaS), provides communication that is reli-
able, schedulable, configurable, and (if neces-
sary) encrypted. This communication enables
CaaS to perform services like network secu-
rity, real-time adjustment of virtual overlays to
provide better networking bandwidth or traffic
flow, and network monitoring. Through net-
work monitoring, cloud-providers can track the
portion of network resources being used by each
customer. This “pay for what you use” concept
is analogous to traditional public utilities like
water and electricity provided by utility com-
panies and is referred to as utility computing.
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephones,
instant messaging, and audio and video con-
ferencing are all possible services which could
be offered by CaaS in the future. As a result
of all three software infrastructure subcompo-
nents, cloud-customers can rent virtual server
time (and thus their storage space and pro-
cessing power) to host web and online gaming
servers, to store data, or to provide any other
service that the customer desires.
There are several Virtual Infrastructure Man-
agements in IaaS, such as CLEVER [25], Open-
QRM [8], OpenNebula [16], and Nimbus [19].
CLEVER aims to provide Virtual infrastructure
Management services and suitable interfaces at
the High-level Management layer to enable the
integration of high-level features such as Public
Cloud Interfaces, Contextualization, Security
and Dynamic Resources provisioning. Open-
QRM is an open-source platform for enabling
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flexible management of computing infrastruc-
tures. It is able to implement a cloud with
several features that allows the automatic de-
ployment of services. It supports different vir-
tualization technologies and format conversion
during migration. OpenNebula is an open and
flexible tool that fits into existing data center en-
vironments to build a Cloud computing environ-
ment. OpenNebula can be primarily used as a
virtualization tool to manage virtual infrastruc-
tures in the data-center or cluster, which is usu-
ally referred as Private Cloud. Only the more
recent versions of OpenNebula are trying to
support Hybrid Cloud to combine local infras-
tructure with public cloud-based infrastructure,
enabling highly scalable hosting environments.
OpenNebula also supports Public Clouds by
providing Cloud interfaces to expose its func-
tionalities for virtual machine, storage and net-
work management. Nimbus provides two levels
of guarantees: 1) quality of life: users get ex-
actly the (software) environment they need, and
2) quality of service: provision and guarantee
all the resources the workspace needs to func-
tion correctly (CPU, memory, disk, bandwidth,
availability), allowing for dynamic renegotia-
tion to reflect changing requirements and condi-
tions. In addition, Nimbus can also provision a
virtual cluster forGrid applications (e.g. a batch
scheduler, or a workflow system), which is also
dynamically configurable, a growing trend in
Grid Computing.
The next layer is called the software environ-
ment, or platform, layer and for this reason is
commonly referred to as Platform as a Service
(PaaS). The primary users of this abstract layer
are the cloud application developers who use it
as ameans to implement and distribute their pro-
grams via the cloud. Typically, cloud applica-
tion developers are providedwith a programming-
language-level environment and a pre-defined
set of application programming interfaces (APIs)
to allow their software to properly interact with
the software environment contained in the cloud.
Two such examples of current software en-
vironments available to cloud software devel-
opers are the Google App Engine and Sales-
force.com’s Apex code. Google App Engine
provides both Java and Python runtime envi-
ronments as well as several API libraries to
cloud application developers [13], while Sales-
force.com’s Apex code is an object-oriented
programming language that allows developers
to run and customize programs that interact
with Force.com platform servers [14]. When
developers design their cloud software for a spe-
cific cloud environment, their applications are
able to utilize dynamic scaling and load bal-
ancing as well as easily have access to other
services provided by the cloud software en-
vironment provider like authentication and e-
mail. This makes designing a cloud applica-
tion a much easier, faster, and more manage-
able task. Another example of the PaaS is the
Azure from Microsoft [46]. Applications for
Microsoft’s Azure are written using the .NET
libraries, and compiled to the Common Lan-
guage Runtime, a language-independent man-
aged environment. The framework is signifi-
cantly more flexible than AppEngine’s, but still
constrains the user’s choice of storage model
and application structure. Thus, Azure is inter-
mediate between application frameworks like
AppEngine and hardware virtual machines like
EC2 [47]. The top layer of cloud computing
above the software environment is the appli-
cation layer. Dubbed as Software as a Ser-
vice (SaaS), this layer acts as an interface be-
tween cloud applications and end-users to offer
them on-demand and many times fee-based ac-
cess to web-based software through their web
browsers. Because cloud users run programs by
utilizing the computational power of the cloud-
provider’s servers, the hardware requirements
of cloud users’ machines can often be signif-
icantly reduced. Cloud-providers are able to
seamlessly update their cloud applicationswith-
out requiring users to install any sort of up-
grade or patch since all cloud software resides
on servers located in the provider’s data centers.
Google Apps and ZOHO R©are two examples of
offerings currently available. In many cases the
software layer of cloud computing completely
eliminates the need for users to install and run
software on their own computers. This, in turn,
moves the support and maintenance of applica-
tions from the end-user to the company or or-
ganization that owns and maintains the servers
that distribute the software to customers.
There are several other layer architectures in
cloud computing. For example, Sotomayor et
al. proposed a three-layer model [37]: cloud
management, Virtual infrastructure (VI) man-
agement, andVMmanager. Cloudmanagement
provides remote and secure interfaces for creat-
ing, controlling, and monitoring virtualized re-
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sources on an infrastructure-as-a-service cloud.
VI management provides primitives to sched-
ule and manage VMs across multiple physical
hosts. VM managers provide simple primitives
(start, stop, suspend) tomanageVMson a single
host. Wang et al. presented a cloud computing
architecture, the Cumulus architecture [45]. In
this architecture, there are also three layers: vir-
tual network domain, physical network domain,
and Oracle file system.
2.2. Management Strategies for
Multiple Clouds [17]
In order to mitigate the risks associated with un-
reliable cloud services, businesses can choose to
use multiple clouds in order to achieve adequate
fault-tolerance – a system’s ability to continue
functioning properly in the event that single or
multiple failures occur in some of its compo-
nents. The multiple clouds utilized can either be
a combination of 1) all public clouds or 2) pub-
lic and private clouds that together form a single
hybrid cloud. A lack ofwell-defined cloud com-
puting standards means that businesses wishing
to utilize multiple clouds must manage multi-
ple, often unique cloud interfaces to achieve
their desired level of fault-tolerance and com-
putational power. This can be achieved through
the formulation of cloud interface standards so
that any public cloud available to customers
utilizes at least one well-defined standardized
interface. As long as all cloud-providers use
a standardized interface, the actual technology
and infrastructure implemented by the cloud is
not relevant to the end-user. Also, some type of
resource management architecture is needed to
monitor, maximize, and distribute the compu-
tational resources available from each cloud to
the business.
There are several multiple cloudsmanagements,
including the Intercloud Protocols [20], and
some method of cloud federation [5, 7, 48].
The Intercloud Protocols consist of six layers:
actual physical layer, physical metaphor layer,
platform metaphor layer, communication layer,
management layer and endpoints layer. The
possibility of a worldwide federation of Clouds
has been studied recently [3, 5, 48]. Some of the
challenges ahead for the Clouds, like monitor-
ing, storage, QoS, federation of different orga-
nizations, etc. have been previously addressed
by grids. Clouds present, however, specific ele-
ments that call for standardization too; e.g. vir-
tual images format or instantiation/migration
APIs [5]. So enhancing existing standards is
granted to ensure the required interoperability.
Figure 3. Architecture for resource management that
allows fault-tolerance cloud computing.
Resource management architecture is realized
by using abstract computational resources as its
most basic building block. Next, a set of op-
erations are defined so that each computational
resource can be identified, started, stopped, or
queried by the resource manager as to their pro-
cessing state. Finally, the resource manager
should provide some sort of interface to the IT
employees of the company utilizing it to allow
them to view, as well as manually modify, the
amount of cloud computational resources be-
ing used by the company. Upon proper set-up
and configuration of IT services from multiple
cloud-providers, the resource manager should
map the actual resources of each connected
cloud to a generic, abstract representation of
its computational resources. Ideally, once the
actual resources of a cloud from a particular
cloud-provider have been mapped, then any
other cloud from that same cloud-provider could
also be ported over to the resource manager
as a generic computational resource represen-
tation using the same mapping scheme. Us-
ing the newly created generic representations
of computational resources, the resource man-
ager’s algorithm could systematically identify
each available resource, query its amount of uti-
lized processing power, and then start or stop the
resource accordingly in such a way as to maxi-
mize the total amount of cloud resources avail-
able to the business for a targeted price level.
This process is depicted in Figure 3. Depend-
ing on each business’s scenario and individual
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preferences, the development of a suitable algo-
rithm for the cloud manager to implement could
be a seemingly complex task.
One such instance of a hybrid cloud resource
manager has been realized through the collab-
oration of Dodda, Moorsel, and Smith [15].
Their cloud management architecture managed
in tandem the Amazon EC2 via Query and
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) inter-
faces as well as their own private cloud via a
Representational State Transfer (REST) inter-
face. The Query interface of EC2 uses a query
string placed in the Uniform Resource Loca-
tor (URL) to implement the management op-
erations of the resource manager. Amazon, as
the cloud-provider, provides a list of defined
parameters and their corresponding values to
be included in a query string by the resource
manager. These query strings are sent by the
cloud resource manager to a URL called out by
the cloud-provider via HTTP GET messages in
order to perform necessary management oper-
ations. In this way, EC2’s interface is mapped
to a generic interface that can be manipulated
by the resource manager. The SOAP interface
of EC2 operates very similarly to the Query in-
terface. The same operations are available to
resource managers using the SOAP interfaces
as are available when using the Query interface,
and HTTP GET messages are sent to a URL
specified by the cloud-provider in order to per-
form cloud management operations. The only
difference between the two interfaces is the ac-
tual parameters themselves that are needed to
perform each operation.
The REST interface of the private cloud assigns
a global identifier, in this case a Uniform Re-
source Identifier (URI), to each local resource.
Each local resource is then manipulated via
HTTP and mapped to its generic interface in
much the same way as EC2’s SOAP and Query
interfaces. After each cloud-specific interface
had been successfully mapped to its generic in-
terface, the resource manager was able to ef-
fectively oversee both the EC2 and the private
cloud at the same time by using a single, com-
mon set of interface commands.
However, one might wonder whether the choice
of interface that the resource manager uses to
oversee a cloud has a significant influence on the
cloud’s performance. To answer this question, a
series of 1,000 identical management operation
commandswere issued by the resource manager
to EC2 via the Query interface. Each command
was issued a timestamp upon transmission from
and arrival to the resource manager. Then, the
same process was repeated for EC2 using the
SOAP interface. A comparison of both inter-
faces’ response times yielded a mean response
time of 508 milliseconds (ms) for the Query
interface and 905 ms for the SOAP interface.
Thus, the SOAP interface’s response time was
nearly double the response time of the Query
interface. In addition, the variance of the SOAP
interface response times was much larger than
the variance exhibited by the response times of
the Query interface. So, the Query interface’s
response time is not only faster on average, but
also more consistent than the response time of
the SOAP interface. Based on these results, it
should come as no surprise that most businesses
use EC2’s Query interface instead of its SOAP
interface. This comparison clearly shows that
when using a particular cloud, businesses must
be careful in choosing the most responsive inter-
face to connect to their resource manager so as
to maximize performance and quality of service
(QoS). The less amount of time required for pro-
cessing commands issued by the resource man-
ager, the more responsive the resource manager
can be at maximizing and distributing the com-
putational resources available from each cloud
to the business.
Another example of hybrid cloud management
described by H. Chen et al. utilizes a technique
called intelligentworkload factoring (IWF) [17].
As was the case with the previously described
cloud resource manager approach, businesses
can utilize IWF to satisfy highly dynamic com-
puting needs. The architecture of the IWF
management scheme allows the entire compu-
tational workload to be split into two separate
types of loads, a base load and a trespassing
load, when extreme spikes in the workload oc-
cur. The base load consists of the smaller,
steady workload that is constantly demanded
by users of cloud computing services while the
trespassing load consists of the bigger, transient
workload demanded on an unpredictable basis
by users. Both loads are managed indepen-
dently from one another in separate resource
zones. The resources necessary to handle the
base load can be obtained from a company’s
private cloud, and are thus referred to as the
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base load resource zone, while the elastic com-
putational power to meet the needs of the tres-
passing load can be accessed on-demand via
a public cloud supplied by a cloud-provider,
which is also known as the trespassing load re-
source zone. Base load management should
proactively seek to use base zone resources ef-
ficiently by using predictive algorithms to an-
ticipate the future base load conditions present
at all times in the company’s network. In con-
trast, trespass load management should have the
ability to devote trespass zone resources to sud-
den, unpredictable changes in the trespass load
in a systematic, yet agile fashion. Part of the
IWF model’s task is to ensure that the base load
remains within the amount planned for by the
company’s IT department; in most cases, this
is the computing capacity of the business’s pri-
vate cloud (i.e. on-site servers in data center).
By doing this, the computational capacity that
the business’s on-site data center has to be over-
planned for is considerably decreased, resulting
in less capital expenditure and server underuti-
lization for the business. The other part of the
IWF model’s job is to make sure a minimal
amount of data replication is required to process
the services obtained from the public cloud.
One instance of such an IWFmanagement scheme
was created by H. Chen and his colleagues [14].
Their system employed a private cloud in the
form of a local cloud cluster as its base load
resource zone and the Amazon EC2 as its tres-
passing load resource zone. The architecture
used in this IWF hybrid cloud management sys-
tem is depicted in Figure 4.
The IWF module, located at the very front of the
management architecture, has a job that’s two-
fold: first, it should send a smooth, constant
workload to the base zone while at the same
time avoid overloading either zone by exces-
sively redirecting load traffic; second, the IWF
module should effectively break down the over-
all load initiated by users of the network, both
by type and amount of requested data. The pro-
cess of load decomposition helps to avoid data
redundancy in the management scheme. The
base zone of the IWF system is on 100% of the
time, and, as mentioned previously, the volume
of the base load does not vary much with time.
As a result, the resources of the private cloud
that handle the base load are able to be run
very efficiently. Nonetheless, a small amount
of over-provisioning is still necessary in order
for the local cloud cluster to be able to handle
small fluctuations in the base load volume and
to guarantee an acceptable QoS to the business’
employees. The trespassing zone of the system
is only on for X% of the time, where X is typi-
cally a small single-digit number. Because the
Figure 4. The IWF hybrid cloud management system [17].
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trespassing zonemust be able to adequately han-
dle large spikes in processing demand, its com-
putational capacity must be over-provisionedby
a considerably large amount.
The procedure for implementing IWF can be
modeled as a hypergraph partitioning problem
consisting of vertices and nets. Data objects in
the load traffic, such as streaming videos or ta-
bles in a database, are represented by vertices,
while the requests to access these data objects
are modeled as nets.
The link between a vertex and a net depicts the
relationship that exists between a data object
and its access request. Formally, a hypergraph
is defined as
H = (V,N) (1)
where V is the vertex set and N is the net set.
Each vertex vi ∈ V is assigned weights wi and
si that represent the portion of the workload
caused by the ith data object and the data size
of the ith data object, respectively. The weight
wi is computed as the average workload per ac-
cess request of the ith data object multiplied
by its popularity. Each net nj ∈ N is assigned
a cost cj that represents the expected network
overhead required to perform an access request
of type j. The cost cj attributed to each net is
calculated as the expected number of type j ac-
cess requests multiplied by the total data size of
all neighboring data objects. The problem that
must be solved in the design of the IWFmanage-
ment system involves assigning all data objects,
or vertices, to two separate locations without
causing either location to exceed its workload
capacitywhile at the same time achieving amin-








where the first summation is the total cost of all
nets that extend across multiple locations (i.e.
the data consistency overhead), the second sum-
mation is the total data size of objects located
in the trespassing zone (i.e. the data replication
overhead), and  is a weighting factor for each
of the two summations.
The IWF management scheme consists of three
main components: workload profiling, fast fac-
toring, and base load threshold. A flow diagram
of how these three components interact is shown
in Figure 5. The workload profiling component
continually updates the system load as changes
occur to the number and nature of computing
requests initiated by users of the network. By
comparing the current system load with the base
load threshold (the maximum load that the base
zone can adequately handle), the workload pro-
filing component places the system in one of
two states – normal mode if the system load
is less than or equal to the base load threshold
or panic mode if the system load is greater than
the base load threshold. The base load threshold
can either be set manually by those in charge of
the system or automatically by utilizing the past
history of the base load. When the system is in
normal mode, the fast factoring component for-
wards the current system load to the base zone.
However, when the system is in panic mode,
the fast factoring component implements a fast
frequent data object detection algorithm to see
if a computing request is seeking a data object
that is in high demand.
Figure 5. Flow diagram of IWF management scheme
components [17].
If the object being requested is not in high de-
mand, the fast factoring component forwards
that portion of the system load to the base zone;
if the requested object is in high demand, that
portion of the system load is immediately for-
warded to the trespassing zone. In essence, the
fast factoring component removes the sporadic
surges in computing power from the base zone
(which is not equipped to handle such requests)
and instead shifts them over to the trespassing
zone (which is over provisioned to handle such
spikes in the computing load) to be processed.
The fast frequent data object detection algo-
rithm features a First In, First Out (FIFO) queue
of the past c computing requests as well as two
lists of the up-to-date k most popular data ob-
jects and historical k most popular data objects
based on the frequency of access requests for
each data object. The algorithm uses its queue
and popular data object lists to accurately pin-
point data objects that are in high demand by
the system The level of accuracy achieved by
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the algorithm depends largely on how correct
the counters are that measure the numbers of
access requests for each data object For a data






where requestsT is the number of access re-
quests for data object T and requeststotal is the
total number of access requests for all data ob-
jects combined. The algorithm can approximate
p(Tˆ) (where the hat indicates an approximation















where  is a relatively small number that repre-
sents the percent error in the request rate approx-
imation for a data object T . Obviously, a lower
 (and thus percent error in approximating ac-
cess request rates) allows the algorithm to more
accurately determine which data objects are in
high demand so that the frequent requests for
such data objects can be passed on to the tres-
passing zone of the IWF management system
and processed accordingly. Therefore, through
the use of the fast frequent data object detection
algorithm the performance of the IWF hybrid
cloud management system is greatly improved.
As a way to compare the costs of different cloud
computing configurations, H. Chen and his col-
leagues [17] used the hourly workload data from
Yahoo! Video’s web service measured over a
46-day period to serve as a sample workload.
The workload (measured in terms of requested
video streams per hour) contained a total of over
32 million stream requests. The three cloud
computing configurations considered were: 1)
a private cloud composed of a locally operated
data center, 2) the Amazon EC2 public cloud,
and 3) a hybrid cloud containing both a local
cloud cluster to handle the bottom 95-percentile
of the workload and the Amazon EC2 public
cloud provisioned on-demand to handle the top
5-percentile of the workload. For the Amazon
EC2, the price of a single machine hour was
assumed to be $0.10. The cost results of the
study are shown in Table 1, where for the sake
of simplification, only the costs associated with
running the servers themselves are considered.
From Table 1, implementing a private cloud
that could handle Yahoo! Video’s typical video
streaming workload would require the yearly
cost of maintaining 790 servers in a local data
center. To handle the same workload using only
a public cloud like Amazon EC2’s would cost
a staggering $1.3 million per year! Needless
to say, although $0.10 per machine hour does
not seem like a considerable cost, it adds up
very quickly for a load of considerable size.
Finally, the hybrid cloud configuration imple-
menting IWF still maintains the ability to han-
dle large fluctuations in load demand and re-
quires a yearly cost of approximately $60,000
plus the cost of operating 99 servers in a local
data center. This is by far the most attractive
configuration among the three cloud computing
models and should warrant strong consideration
by any small or midsize business.
Cloud Computing
Configuration Annual Cost




$58,960 plus cost of running
a data center composed of
99 servers
Table 1. Cost comparsion of three different cloud
computing configurations [17].
2.3. Integrate Sensor Networks and Cloud
Computing [18]
In addition to cloud computing, wireless sen-
sor networks (WSNs) are quickly becoming a
technological area of expansion. The ability
of their autonomous sensors to collect, store,
and send data pertaining to physical or envi-
ronmental conditions while being remotely de-
ployed in the field has made WSNs a very at-
tractive solution for many problems in the areas
of industrial monitoring, environmental moni-
toring, building automation, asset management,
and health monitoring. WSNs have enabled a
whole new wave of information to be tapped
that has never before been available. By sup-
plying this immense amount of real-time sensor
data to people via software, the applications are
limitless: up-to-date traffic information could
be made available to commuters, the vital signs
of soldiers on the battlefield could be monitored
by medics, and environmental data pertaining to
A Review on Cloud Computing: Design Challenges in Architecture and Security 35
earthquakes, hurricanes, etc. could be analyzed
by scientists to help predict further disasters.
All of the data made available using WSNs will
need to be processed in some fashion. Cloud
computing is a very real option available to sat-
isfy the computing needs that arise from pro-
cessing and analyzing all of the collected data.
A content-based publish/subscribe model for
how WSNs and cloud computing can be in-
tegrated together is described in [18]. Pub-
lish/subscribemodels do not require publishers,
or sensor nodes, to send their messages to any
specific receiver, or subscriber. Instead, sent
messages are classified into classes and those
who want to view messages, or sensor data,
pertaining to a particular class simply subscribe
to that class. By disconnecting the sensor nodes
from its subscribers, the abilities of a WSN
to scale in size and its nodes to dynamically
change position are greatly increased. This is
necessary as nodes are constantly reconfiguring
themselves in an ad-hoc manner to react to sud-
denly inactive, damaged nodes as well as newly
deployed and/or repositioned nodes. In order
to deliver both real-time and archived sensor in-
formation to its subscribers, an algorithm that
quickly and efficientlymatches sensor data to its
corresponding subscriptions is necessary. In ad-
dition, the computing power needed to process
and deliver extremely large amounts of real-
time, streaming sensor data to its subscribers
may (depending on the transient spikes of the
load) force cloud providers to be unable tomain-
tain a certain QoS level. Therefore, a Virtual
Organization (VO) of cloud-providers might be
necessary to ensure that this scenario does not
occur. In a VO, a dynamic partnership is formed
with a certain understanding regarding the shar-
ing of resources to accomplish individual but
broadly related goals.
In the model described by M. M. Hassan et
al. [18], sensor data is received by the gateway
nodes of each individual WSN. These gateway
nodes serve as the intermediary between the
sensor nodes and a publisher/subscriber broker.
The publisher/subscriber broker’s job is to de-
liver sensor information to the SaaS cloud com-
puting applications under dynamically chang-
ing conditions. In this way, sensor data from
each WSN need only to be sent to one fixed lo-
cation, the publisher/subscriber broker, instead
of directly to multiple SaaS applications simul-
taneously; this reduces the amount of complex-
ity necessary in the sensor and gateway nodes
and allows for the cost of the nodes that com-
prise WSNs to remain minimal. The pub-
lisher/subscriber broker consists of four main
components: the stream monitoring and pro-
cessing component (SMPC), registry compo-
nent (RC), analyzer component (AC), and dis-
seminator component (DC). TheSMPCreceives
the various streams of sensor data and initi-
ates the proper method of analysis for each
stream. The AC ascertains which SaaS appli-
cations the sensor data streams should be sent
to and whether or not they should be delivered
on a periodic or emergency basis. After proper
determination, the AC passes this information
on to the DC for delivery to its subscribers via
SaaS applications. The DC component utilizes
an algorithm designed to match each set of sen-
sor data to its corresponding subscriptions so
that it can ultimately distribute sensor data to
users of SaaS applications. SaaS supplications
are implemented using cloud resources and thus
can be run from any machine that is connected
to the cloud. SaaS packages the sensor data
produced from WSNs into a usable graphical
interface that can be examined and sorted by its
users.
2.4. Typical Applications of Cloud
Computing
In describing the benefits of cloud computing,
one cannot help being bombarded by reasons
related to economics. The two main reasons
why cloud computing can be viewed as bene-
ficial and worthwhile to individual consumers
and companies alike are its cheap cost and ef-
ficient utilization of computing resources. Be-
cause cloud computing users only purchase the
on-demand virtual server time and applications
they need at little to no upfront cost, the capi-
tal expenditure associated with purchasing the
physical network infrastructure is no longer re-
quired. Moreover, the physical space needed
to house the servers and switches, the IT staff
needed to operate, maintain, and upgrade the
data center, and the energy costs of operating
the servers are all suddenly deemed unneces-
sary.
For small businesses, barriers to enter markets
that require significant amounts of computing
power are substantially lowered. This means
that small companies have newly found access
to computing power that they otherwise would
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never have been able to acquire. Because com-
puting power costs are calculated based on us-
age, small businesses do not have to take on
the unnecessary risk associated with commit-
ting a large amount of capital to purchasing net-
work infrastructure. The ability of a company
to grow or shrink the size of its workforce based
on business demand without having to scale its
network infrastructure capacity accordingly is
another benefit of on-demand pricing and sup-
ply of computing power [21].
While operating completely without any on-
location, physical servers might be an option
for some small companies, many colleges and
large companies might not consider this option
very feasible. However, they could still stand
to benefit from cloud computing by construct-
ing a private cloud. Although a private cloud
would still require on-site server maintenance
and support and its relatively small size would
prevent benefits related to economies of scale
from being realized, the efficiency gains real-
ized from server virtualization would be large
enough inmost cases to justify the effort. The IT
research firm Infotech estimates that distributed
physical servers “generally use only 20 percent
of their capacity, and that, by virtualizing those
server environments, enterprises can boost hard-
ware utilization to between 60 percent and 80
percent” [22]. In addition, the private cloud
could be connected to a public cloud as a source
of on-demand computing power. This would
help combat instances where spikes in compu-
tational power exceeded the capacity of the pri-
vate cloud’s virtualized servers. Part of section
V, entitled ‘Management Strategies for Multiple
Clouds’, explicates in considerable detail how
multiple clouds, whether public or private, can
be usefully utilized together in this manner.
2.5. Comparisons on Cloud Computing
Models
From the preceding discussion it might seem as
if cloud computing has virtually no downsides
associated with it as long as the cloud is large
enough in size to realize economies of scale;
yet, cloud computing does have several draw-
backs. Because cloud computing is still a new
concept and still in its infant stages of develop-
ment, there is currently a lack of well-defined
market standards. This also means that a con-
stant flow of new cloud-providers is entering
the cloud computing market in an effort to each
secure a large and loyal customer base.
As is the case with any developing technol-
ogy, a constantly changing marketplace makes
choosing the right cloud-provider and the proper
cloud computing standards difficult. Customers
face the risk of choosing a wrong provider who
will soon go out of business and take the cus-
tomer’s data with them or backing a cloud com-
puting standard that will eventually become ob-
solete. Once an individual consumer or busi-
ness has chosen a particular provider and its
associated cloud, it is currently difficult (but
not altogether impossible) to transfer data be-
tween clouds if the customer wants to switch
cloud-providers, and most likely, the customer
will have to pay for the move in the form of
switching costs.
Although virtualization has helped resource ef-
ficiency in servers, currently, performance in-
terference effects still occur in virtual environ-
ments where the same CPU cache and trans-
lation lookaside buffer (TLB) hierarchy are
shared by multiple VMs. The increasing num-
ber of servers possessing multi-core processors
further compounds the effects of this issue. As
a result of these interference effects, cloud-
providers are currently not able to offer their
customers an outright guarantee as to the spe-
cific level of computing performance that will
be provided.
The physical location of a cloud-provider’s ser-
vers determines the extent to which data stored
on those servers is confidential. Due to re-
cent laws such as the Patriot Act, files stored
on servers that physically reside in the United
States are subject to possible intense examina-
tion. For this reason, cloud-providers such as
Amazon.com allow their customers to choose
between using servers located in the United
States or Europe.
Another negative aspect of cloud computing in-
volves data transfer and its associated costs.
Currently, because customers access a cloud
using the Internet, which has limited band-
width, cloud-providers recommend that users
transfer large amounts of information by ship-
ping their external storage devices to the cloud-
provider. Upon receipt of the storage device,
the cloud-provider uploads the customer’s data
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to the cloud’s servers. For instance, Amazon
S3 recommends that customers whose data will
take a week or more to upload should use Ama-
zon Web Services (AWS) Import/Export. This
tool automates shipping an external storage de-
vice toAWS Import/Export using amail courier
such as United Parcel Service (UPS). For this
service, the user is charged $80 per storage de-
vice handled and $2.49 per data-loading hour
(where partial data-loading-hours are billed as
full hours) [23]. Until the Internet infrastruc-
ture is improved several times over, transferring
large amounts of data will be a significant obsta-
cle that prevents some companies from adopting
cloud computing.
There are several different cloud pricing mod-
els available, depending on the provider – the
main three are tiered, per-unit, and subscription-
based pricing. Amazon.com’s clouds offer tiered
pricing that corresponds to varying levels of of-
fered computational resources and service level
agreements (SLAs). SLAs are part of a cloud-
provider’s service contract and define specific
levels of service that will be provided to its
customers. Many cloud-providers utilize per-
unit pricing for data transfers (as mentioned in
the preceding paragraph’s example of AWS Im-
port/Export) and storage space. GoGrid Cloud
Hosting, however,measures their server compu-
tational resources used in random access mem-
ory (RAM) per hour [24]. Subscription-based
pricing models are typically used for SaaS.
Rather than charge users for what they actually
use, cloud-providers allow customers to know
in advance what they will be charged so they
can accurately predict future expenses.
Because transitioning between clouds is diffi-
cult and costly, end-users are somewhat locked
in to whichever cloud-provider they choose.
This presents reliability issues associated with
the chosen cloud. Although rare and only for a
matter of hours in most cases, some cloud ac-
cess failures have already occurred with Google
and Amazon.com’s services. One such outage
occurred with the Amazon EC2 as a result of
a power failure at both its Virginia data center
and its back-up data center in December 2009.
Public Cloud Private Cloud Hybrid Cloud
1. Simplest to implement and use




utilization flexibility of public
and private clouds








4. Widespread accessibility – Suited for handling largespikes in workload
5. Requires no spacededicated for data center – –
6. Suited for handling largespikes in workload – –
1. Most expensive long-term Large upfront costs








of space dedicated for
data center






5. – Not suited for handlinglarge spikes in workload –
Table 2. Summarization of pros and cons for public, private, and hybrid cloud.
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This outage caused many east coast Amazon
AWS users to be without service for approxi-
mately five hours. While these access issues
are inevitable with any data center (including
those on-site), lack of access to a business’s
cloud could occur at very inopportune instances
resulting in a business’s computing capability
being effectively shut down for the duration of
the service outage. This issue has the poten-
tial to nullify the hassle-free benefit that many
cloud-providers tout as a selling point for utiliz-
ing cloud computing.
2.6. Summary of Cloud Computing
Architecture
Acommonmisconception amongmany of those
who would consider themselves “tech-savvy”
technology users is that cloud computing is a
fancy word for grid computing; grid computing
is a form of parallel computing where a group of
networked computers form a single, large vir-
tual supercomputer that can perform obscenely
large amounts of computational operations that
would take normal computers many years to
complete. Although cloud computing is in some
ways a descendant of grid computing, it is by no
means an alternative title. Instead, cloud com-
puting offers software, storage, and/or com-
puting power as a service to its users, whether
they be individuals or employees of a company.
Due to its efficient utilization of computing re-
sources and its ability to scale with workload
demand, cloud computing is an enticing new
technology to businesses of all sizes. However,
the decision each business faces is not quite
as clear-cut as whether cloud computing could
prove beneficial to it. Instead, each business
must make a decision as to what type of cloud
it will utilize: public, private, or hybrid. Each
cloud type has its own set of positives and neg-
atives. These benefits and drawbacks are listed
in Table 2. For example, the public cloud has
the minimum upfront cost due to the fact that
users do not need to invest in the infrastructure.
However, it has the maximum long term cost
since users have to pay for the lease in long
term, while the user in the private cloud need to
pay less in long term due to the ownership of
the cloud.
In recent years, more and more companies have
begun to adopt cloud computing as a way to
cut costs without sacrificing their productivity.
These cost savings stem from little or no up-
keep required by their in-house IT departments
as well as their ability to forego the huge capital
expenditures associatedwith purchasing servers
for their local data center. Even for those com-
panies that adopt hybrid clouds which require
some local servers, the number of these is dra-
matically reduced due to over provisioning of
the data center no longer being necessary. In
addition to cost savings, cloud computing al-
lows companies to remain agile and more dy-
namically responsive to changes in forecasted
business. If a company needs to quickly scale
up or down the computing power of their net-
work infrastructure, they can simply pay for
more on-demand computing resources available
from cloud-providers. This same level of scala-
bility is simply not achievable with a local data
center only. As cloud computing technology
continues to mature, an increasing number of
businesses are going to be willing to adopt it.
For this reason, cloud computing is much more
than just the latest technological buzzword on
the scene – it’s here to stay.
3. Cloud Computing Security
3.1. Why Security in Cloud Computing?
By using offloading data and cloud computing,
a lot of companies can greatly reduce their IT
cost. However, despite tons of merits of cloud
computing, many companies owners began to
worry about the security treats. Because in the
cloud-based computing environment, the em-
ployees can easily access, falsify and divulge
the data. Sometime such behavior is a disaster
for a big and famous company.
Encryption is a kind of ideal way to solve such
problem, whereas for the customers who are us-
ing the cloud computing system cannot use such
encrypted data. The original data must be used
in the host memory otherwise the host VM ma-
chine cannot do applications on-demand. For
that sake, people can hardly achieve the good
security in today’s Cloud services. For exam-
ple, the Amazon’s EC2 is one of the service
providers who have privileged to read and tam-
per the data from the customers. There is no
security for the customers who use such ser-
vice.
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Some service providers develop some technical
method aimed to avoid the security treats from
the interior. For instance, some providers limit
the authority to access and manage the hard-
ware, monitor the procedures, and minimize the
number of staff who has privilege to access the
vital parts of the infrastructure. However, at the
provider backend, the administrator can also ac-
cess the customer’s VM-machine.
Security within cloud computing is an espe-
cially worrisome issue because of the fact that
the devices used to provide services do not be-
long to the users themselves. The users have no
control of, nor any knowledge of, what could
happen to their data. This is a great concern in
cases when users have valuable and personal in-
formation stored in a cloud computing service.
Personal information could be “leaked” out,
leaving an individual user or business vulnera-
ble for attack. Users will not compromise their
privacy so cloud computing service providers
must ensure that the customers’ information is
safe. This, however, is becoming increasingly
challenging because as security developments
are made, there always seems to be someone
to figure out a way to disable the security and
take advantage of user information. Aware of
these security concerns, cloud computing ser-
vice providers could possibly face extinction if
problems which are hindering fail-proof secu-
rity are not resolved.
Designing and creating error-proof and fail-
proof security for cloud computing services falls
on the shoulders of engineers. These engineers
face many challenges. The services must elim-
inate risk of information theft while meeting
government specifications. Some governments
have laws limiting where personal information
can be stored and sent. If too much security de-
tail is relayed to the users, then theymaybecome
concerned and decide against cloud computing
altogether. If too little security detail is relayed
to the users, then the customers will certainly
find business elsewhere. If a cloud comput-
ing service provider’s security is breached and
valuable user information is gathered and used
against them, then the user could, and likely
would, sue the provider and the company could
lose everything. Given these scenarios, engi-
neers certainly have to be flawless in their secu-
rity mechanism designs.
Engineers cannot fixate only on the present is-
sues with cloud computing security but they
must also prepare for the future. As cloud
computing services become increasingly pop-
ular, new technologies are destined to arise.
For example, in the future, user information is
likely going to be transferred among different
service providers. This certainly increases the
complexity of the security mechanism because
the information must be tracked and protected
wherever it may go. As businesses begin to rely
upon cloud computing, the speed of services
will need to be as high as possible. However,
the speed of services cannot come about at the
cost of lowered security, after all security is
the top concern among cloud computing users.
Another aspect of future cloud computing that
engineers must be aware of is the increasing
population of cloud computing users. As cloud
computing services become more popular, the
cloud will have to accommodate more users.
This raises even more concern about informa-
tion security and also increases the complexity
of cloud computing security mechanisms. Se-
curity designers must track every bit of data and
also protect information from other users aswell
as provide a fast and efficient service.
Risk of information theft is different for ev-
ery cloud computing service and thus should be
addressed differently when designing security
schemes. For example, services which process
and store public information that could also be
found in say, a newspaper, would need a very
low amount of security. On the other hand, ser-
vices which process personalized data about an
individual or a business must be kept confiden-
tial and secure. This type of data is most often
at risk when there is unauthorized access to the
service account, lost copies of data throughout
the cloud, or security faults. Because of these
concerns, a security scheme in which all data
have a “tracking device” that is limited to cer-
tain locations could be implemented. However,
care must be taken to also ensure that the data is
not transferred or processed in any way without
the consent and knowledge of the user.
When preparing to design a cloud computing
service and in particular a security scheme, sev-
eral things must be kept in mind in order to
effectively protect user information. First and
foremost, protection of user personal informa-
tion is the top priority. Keeping this in mind
40 A Review on Cloud Computing: Design Challenges in Architecture and Security
will certainly provide a better service to cus-
tomers. The amount of valuable personal in-
formation that is given to a provider should be
kept to a minimum. For example, if the ser-
vice being provided does not require a telephone
number, then the user should not have to offer
that information to the provider. Where pos-
sible, personal information could be encrypted
or somehow kept anonymous. Also, mecha-
nisms which destroy personal data after use and
mechanisms which prevent data copying could
be implemented. The amount of control that
a user has over their information should be in-
creased to amaximum. For example, if a service
requires that some personal information be sent
out through the cloud and processed, then the
user should be able to control where and how
that information is sent. The user should also
be able to view their data and decide whether or
not certain information can be sent out through
the cloud. Before any data processing or storing
is done, the user should be asked for consent to
carry out the operation. Maximizing customer
control and influence will earn user trust and
establish a wider consumer base.
Someorganizations have been focusing on secu-
rity issues in the cloud computing. The Cloud
Security Alliance is a non-profit organization
formed to promote the use of best practices
for providing security assurance within Cloud
Computing, and provide education on the uses
of Cloud Computing to help secure all other
forms of computing [37]. The Open Security
Architecture (OSA) is another organizations fo-
cusing on security issues. They propose the
OSA pattern [38], which pattern is an attempt
to illustrate core cloud functions, the key roles
for oversight and risk mitigation, collaboration
across various internal organizations, and the
controls that require additional emphasis. For
example, the Certification, Accreditation, and
Security Assessments series increase in impor-
tance to ensure oversight and assurance given
that the operations are being “outsourced” to
another provider. System and Services Acqui-
sition is crucial to ensure that acquisition of ser-
vices is managed correctly. Contingency plan-
ning helps to ensure a clear understanding of
how to respond in the event of interruptions to
service delivery. The Risk Assessment controls
are important to understand the risks associated
with services in a business context.
Regarding practical cloud computing products,
Microsoft Azure cloud computing plans to of-
fer a new security structure for its multi-tenant
cloud environments as well as private cloud
software. Google has a multi-layered security
process protocol to secure cloud data. Such
a process has been independently verified in
a successful third-party SAS 70 Type II audit.
Google is also able to efficiently manage se-
curity updates across our nearly homogeneous
global cloud computing infrastructure. Intel
uses SOA Expressway Cloud Gateway to en-
able cloud security. Intel’s Cloud Gateway acts
as a secure broker that provides security cloud
connectors to other companies’ cloud products.
3.2. Encryption-on-Demand [26]
The basic idea for encryption-on-demand is that
they try to use the encryption-on-demand server
which can provide some kind of encryption ser-
vice. For example, when the server gets a
request from user, the website or server will
make a unique encryption program, the so-
called ‘client’ program, send a package includ-
ing such program to the client. However, how
to identify a client program or how to assign a
client program to a client? They use a tailoring
identification (TID) The user can forward the
TID to the server, the server will use TID to
send them the so-tailor made copy. So how do
the users or communication partners compro-
mise the TID? So far, there are many different
ways to do that, by using cell phone, text mes-
sage, or other communication tools. By using
some reference information, such as birth city,
birth day, or some other personal information all
of which can only be known by the communi-
cation partners. As long as the two partners can
receive the client package including the client
program, they can encrypt their messages or
email easily. After communication, both users
should dump the client program they used. So,
every timewhen theywant to communicatewith
each other privately, they need to download the
package.
In Figure 6, the client (both communicating
partners) sends the UID (same UID for two
partners) to the server, the server will assign
a package which binds the encryption system
and choose key to the client. Further, the client
can use such encryption-on-demand package to
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Figure 6. The client sending the UID to the server [26].
encrypt the message and communicate with the
partner.
3.3. Security for the Cloud Infrastructure:
Trusted Virtual Data Center
Implementation [27, 28]
For managing the hardware or resources in the
same physical system, the VMM (virtual ma-
chine monitor) can create multipleVMs (virtual
machines). For the server, this infrastructure
provides a very convenient way to create, mi-
grate, and delete the VMs. The cloud comput-
ing concept can easily achieve the big scale and
cheap services. However, using one physical
machine to execute all the workloads of all the
users, it will make some serious security issues.
Because this infrastructure needs many likeli-
hood components, it will easily lead to the mis-
configuration problems. The so-called trusted
virtual data center has different VMs and as-
sociated hardware resources. In this way, the
VM will know which resource it can access.
TVDc can separate each customer workloads
to different associated virtual machines. The
advantages are very obvious, 1) make sure no
workload can leak to other customers, 2) in case
of some malicious programs like viruses, they
cannot be spread to other nodes, 3) prevent the
misconfiguration problems.
TVDc uses the so-called isolation policy, so it
can separate both the hardware resource and
users’ workload or data. The isolation policy
can manage the data center, access the VMs,
and switch from one VM to another VM. TVDc
consists of a bunch of VMs and the associ-
ated resources which can be used for one user’s
program. In TVD, the VMs have some labels
which can be identified uniquely. For example,
one label is corresponded with one customer or
the customer’s data. TVDc isolation policy in-
cludes two major tasks: (1) label that can be
used to indentify the VMs which are assigned
to the customers, (2) allow all the VMs to run
on the same TVD. Based on the security label,
the control management can assign the author-
ity to the users for the accessibility. Figure 7
illustrates such a principle.
There are three basic components in the net-
work (Figure 8), such as Client: the laptop,
desktop or PDA which can be seen as the data
resource. These data need to be processed by
the cloud servers. Cloud storage server (CSS)
has a huge space to store the data. Third party
auditor (TPA) can be responded with the data
verification. In Figure 8, the client can deliver
the data to the cloud server, the admin will pro-
cess the data before storage. Since all these data
aren’t processed in the local computer, the cus-
tomer needs to verify whether or not the data is
correct. Without monitoring the data, the user
needs a delegate like the TPA to monitor the
data.
The client needs to check the data in the server
and make sure all the data of the cloud is correct
without any modifying periodically. However,
in reality, we assume the adversary can freely
access the storage in the server. For example,
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Figure 7. Enabling public verifiability and data dynamics for storage security [27].
Figure 8. The architecture of cloud data storage [27].
the adversary can play a role of a monitor or
TPA. In this way, the adversary can easily cheat
the user during the verifying of the data’s cor-
rectness. Generally, the adversary can use some
methods to generate the valid acknowledgments
and deliver the verification. Both the server and
user can hardly detect such attack.
3.4. Towards Trusted Cloud Computing [28]
Figure 9. The simple architecture of Eucalyptus [28].
A traditional trusted computing architecture can
provide some-degree security for the customers.
Such system can forbid the owner of a host to
interfere all the computation. The customer can
also run the remote testing program which can
let the customer know if the procedure of the
host is secure or not. If the users or customers
detect any kind of abnormal behavior from the
host, they can immediately terminate their VM-
machines. Unfortunately, such apparent perfect
platforms also have some fatal flaws. For exam-
ple, as we know, the service providers always
provide a list of available machines to the cus-
tomers. Afterwards, the customer will be au-
tomatically assigned a machine. However such
dynamical assigned machine from the provider
backend can incur some kinds of security threat
which cannot be solved by such system.
Many cloud providers allow customers to access
virtual machines which were hosted by service
providers. So user or customer can be seen as
the data source for the software running in the
VM in the lower layer. In contrast, in the higher
layer, the server side can provide all the appli-
cation on-demand.
The reason of the difficulty to provide an effec-
tive security environment for the user is the fact
that all the data which need to be processed will
be executed directly at higher layers. Briefly,
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we just focus on the lower layer in the customer
side, because it is managed more easily.
In Eucalyptus (Figure 9), this system can man-
age multiple clusters in which every node can
run a virtual machinemonitorwhich can be used
to host the user’s VM. CM is the cloud manager
which responds to a set of nodes in one clus-
ter. From the user side, Eucalyptus can provide
a bunch of interfaces to use the VM which is
assigned to the customer. Every VM needs a
virtual machine image for launching it. Before
launching a VM, VM needs to load VMI. For
CM, it can provide some kind of services which
can be used to add or remove VMI or users.
The sys admin in the cloud has some kind of
privilege and ability to use the backend perform
various kind of attacks such as access to the
memory of one user’s VM. As long as the sys
admin has the root privileges at the machine, he
or she can use some special software to do some
malicious action. Xen can do the livemigration,
switching its physical host. Because Xen is run-
ning at the backend of the provider, Xenaccess
can enable the sys admin to run as a customer
level process in order to directly access the data
of a VM’s memory. In this way, the sys admin
can do more serious attacks such as the cold
boot attacks. Currently we don’t worry about
such vulnerability because most of IaaS (infras-
tructure as a Service) providers have some very
strict limitation in order to prevent one single
person to accumulate all the authorities. Such
policy can efficiently avoid the physical access
attacks.
We assume the sys admins can log in any ma-
chine by using the root authority. In order to
access the customers’ machine, the sys admins
can switch a VM which already runs a cus-
tomer’s VM to one under his or her control.
Thus, the TCCP limit the execution of VM in
the IaaS perimeter and sys admin cannot access
the memory of a host’s machine running a VM.
The Trusted Computing (Figure 10) is based on
a smart design which uses a so-called trusted
platform module (TPM) chip which has a kind
of endorsement private key (EK). Moreover,
each TPM is bundled with each node in the
Perimeter. The service providers can use public
key to ensure both the chip and the private key
are correct.
At the boot time, the host’ machine will gener-
ate a list of ML which include a bunch of hashes
which is so-called the BIOS, further, both the
boot loader and the software begin to run the
platform. ML will be stored in the TPM of a
host. In order to test the platform, the platform
will ask the TPM in the host machine to make
a message including the ML, a random num-
ber K, and the private EK. Moreover, the sender
will send this message to the remote part. In
the remote part, by using the public key, it can
easily decrypt the message and authenticate the
Figure 10. The trusted cloud computing platform TC (trusted coordinator) [28].
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correspond host. Here, we use a table to rep-
resent the major ideas and differences for the
above 3 security methods.
Table 3 compares the above three security sche-
mes.
3.5. Privacy Model [29]
Privacy is a fundamental human right; secu-
rity schemes in cloud computing services must
meetmany government regulations and abide by
many laws [29]. These laws and regulations are
primarily aimed toward protecting information
which can be used to identify a person (such
as a bank account number or social security
number). Of course, these stipulations make
cloud computing security even more difficult to
implement. Many security schemes have been
proposed, but the factor of accountability must
be included in all systems, regardless of specific
components.
Reasonable solutions to cloud computing secu-
rity issues involve several elements. First, users
must constantly be informed of how and where
their data is being sent. Likewise, it is just
as important to inform users of how and where
their incoming information is received. Second,
service providers should give users contractual
agreements that assure privacy protection. This
type of accountability will provide a control
mechanism which will allow users to gain trust
of their providers. Third, service providersmust
accept a responsibility to their customers to es-
tablish security and privacy standards. Having
standards will certainly help to provide some
organization to all security schemes. Lastly,
service providers should work with their cus-
tomers to achieve some feedback in order to
continuously update and improve their security
schemes.
It is very obvious that cloud computing will
greatly benefit consumers as well as internet
providers. In order for cloud computing ap-
plications to be successful however, customer
security must be attained. Presently, the secu-
rity of cloud computing users is far from certain.
Cloud computing security must be greatly im-
proved in order to earn the trust of more people
who are potential cloud computing customers.
One tempting solution, which has been focused
on in the past, is to hide user identifiable infor-
mation and provide means of anonymous data
transfer between user and a cloud computing
service. However, this solution is not the best
way to provide cloud computing security be-
cause users often need to communicate identifi-
able information to the cloud computing service
provider in order to receive the requested ser-
vice. A concept will now be presented in the
context of a group or business participating in a
cloud computing service [29].
One suggestion for information privacy in cloud
computing services is not to hide identifiable
data tracks, but rather to encrypt user identi-
fiable data tracks. This particular method is
based on a vector space model which is used to
represent group profiles as well as group mem-




for the methods pros cons
Encryption-
on-Demand
Both sender and receiver
share the same TID in
order to get client
package for encryption
Using random encrypt-
system good for security
Need local machine
to encrypt the data




By using TVDc, the server
side can easily assign the
different components for
different users preventing
the data leak to other users
Reduce the payload for
one physical machine and
avoid the misconfiguration
problem, good for users
data security
The user should check
the data frequently to make
sure it won’t be changed
Towards Trusted
Cloud Computing
The server can generate a
random number K and a
private key sent to the
user for authentication
Good security by using
private key and public key
It can also have some
problems if the attackers
use the playback attack
Table 3. The major ideas and differences for 3 security methods [29].
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of several members, is participating in informa-
tion exchange via a cloud computing service.
When the members are logged on to the service,
any information that each member transfers is
continuously tracked. While all information is
being tracked, false information is continuously
generated. The actual information and gener-
ated false information are randomly mixed to-
gether. This information mixture disrupts the
ability of any potential hacker to obtain user
identifiable information. The false information
generated is not completely random, but rather
it is constructed to be similar to the actual infor-
mation in order to further deceive any potential
hacker. Furthermore, the generated false data
is cleverly constructed such that is appears to
have been generated by the users. This method
also allows users to adjust the level of desired
privacy. Of course, however, different levels of
security have desirable and undesirable trade-
offs (less privacy allows for faster data transfer,
etc.).
The vector space model used for this privacy
protection method is used to represent user pro-
files. All information within the vector space
model is represented as a vector of weighted
terms, where the terms are weighted by level
of importance. Suppose some data, d, is repre-
sented as an n-dimensional vector
d = (w1,w2,w3, . . .wi, . . . ,wn) where wi rep-
resents the weight of the ith term. There are
many ways to calculate the weight of a term but
often the term’s frequency and importance are
the main factors. The vector space is updated
with every website visit or any other informa-
tion transfer based upon user preference. For
the case above, with group participation, the
vector space associated with the group profile is
a weighted average of all member vectors. Any
new data that could possibly be transferred to a
user is analyzed in vector form and if the vector
representing this data closely matches the vec-
tor representing the user profile, then permis-
sion for data transfer is granted. The similarity
between some arbitrary data and a user profile,













where uj and uk represent the vectors them-
selves, tuij and tuik represent the ith terms in
each vector, and n represents the number of
terms contained within each vector.
The generator used to create false information is
a very important part of the non-anonymous pri-
vacy protection method. This generator, called
theTransactionGenerator, references a database
of terms which are closely related to terms asso-
ciated with group interests and the service being
provided. Whenever information is needed to
be encrypted, the Transaction Generator uses
terms in the database to enter into a search en-
gine. The generator then randomly activates
one of the thousands of web sites which result
from the search, to generate a complete trans-
fer of false data (false only relative to the user
requested or sent information). The number of
false transactions generated can be controlled
by the user (or group). In the method being
described, the number of user-controlled fal-
sified transactions is represented by Tr. The
Transaction Generator uses this number to gen-
erate false transactions each time the user sends
out information. The generator does not, how-
ever, generate Tr falsified transactions for each
user information exchange, rather it cleverly
generates Tr average falsified transactions for
each user information exchange. Thus any pre-
dictability is eliminated and security is maxi-
mized. To guarantee that any potential hackers
are distracted, the majority of falsified transac-
tions should consist of web pages which are not
directly related to the actual information, but
rather to the general idea of the actual informa-
tion. Otherwise, hackers could accidentally be
given a route to find identifiable information.
Each time the generator produces a falsified
transaction, a vector of weighted terms is built
up which can be used to strengthen the user or
group profile. An illustration of the transaction
generation process is shown in Figure 11.
There are three calculated parameters which are
used to update and improve privacy protection
each time a user exchanges information and
a falsified transaction is made: The Internal
Group Profile, the Faked Group Profile, and the
External Group Profile. A mechanism called
the Group Profile Meter is implemented in this
method of non-anonymous privacy protection
with a group of users. The Group Profile Me-
ter receives a vector of weighted terms, VUtU ,
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Figure 11. Falsifield transaction generation process for privacy protection [29].
from user information exchange. Using these
vectors, a parameter called the Internal Group
Profile (IGP) is computed. The Internal Group






wherePr represents the number of previous vec-
tors in the profile. A similar mechanism called
the FakedGroup Profile (FGP) is also employed
in this privacy protection method. Like the In-
ternal Group Profile, the Faked Group Profile
is calculated using information provided by the
Group Profile Meter. The Faked Group Profile






Where Pr and Tr have previously been defined
and VTtT is a vector of weighted terms received
from the Group Profile Meter each time a fal-
sified transaction is made by the Transaction
Generator. The Group Profile Meter assembles
a parameter called the External Group Profile
each time a user or false data vector is received.
The External Group Profile (EGP) at any time,
t, is simply calculated as follows:
EGP(t) = IGP(tU) + FGP(tT) (7)
where EGP(t) is updated any time the Internal
or External Group Profiles change. Addition-
ally, the Group Profile Meter can compare the
Internal and External Group Profiles by calcu-
lating a similarity parameter. The similarity













where tigpi is the ith term contained within the
IGP vector, tegpi is the ith term contained within
the EGP vector, and n is the number of terms
contained within each vector. All of the pa-
rameters described allow the non-anonymous
privacy protection method to be continuously
updated and improved in order to provide max-
imum security for user identifiable information.
3.6. Intrusion Detection Strategy [30]
By now it has become very apparent that cloud
computing services can be very beneficial to
users. Cloud computing services will allow
for better economic efficiency for users as well
as service providers. However, maximum ef-
ficiency can only be achieved when the occur-
rence of problems within cloud computing ser-
vices is at a minimum. Most of these problems
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are in the form of security issues. Cloud com-
puting services will not increase in popularity
until security issues are resolved. Presently, se-
curity within cloud computing is far from per-
fect and certainly not fail-proof. Cloud comput-
ing services will only be practical when users
feel safe. One possible solution to safely trans-
fer information is the development of an intru-
sion detection system [30].
Currently, intrusion detection systems are quite
complicated and have much room for improve-
ment. The complexity of these systems arises
due to the variety of intrusions which have
caused the systems to be built up over time.
Cloud computing service providers heavily rely
on these intrusion detection systems but at the
same time they are faced with the issue of trad-
ing good security with efficient performance of
the service. Due to the ongoing efforts of hack-
ers, the intrusion detection systems must be of-
ten updated and re-worked. One proposal for
improvement upon intrusion detection systems
will now be presented. This system will be
beneficial in detecting intrusions within cloud
computing services andwill easily adapt to ever-
changing attacks.
One proposal for an intrusion detection system
is based on a strategy implementing a statistical
model for security. This system is designed to
be flexible and adaptable to the efforts of attack-
ers. Characteristics of the network involved in
the cloud computing service are expressed as
some random variables. The value range of
these variables is limited in order to be able to
identify attacks. When a character, and thus a
random variable, changes, then an attack is be-
ing attempted. When the values of variables are
found to be outside the range of the intervals,
then an intrusion has occurred. If the change in
time can also be realized, then the intrusion can
be successfully detected. This system is orga-
nized by simulations implementing trace data.
All attacks are arranged in a sample space, .
The sample space is then divided into smaller
sub-sets. These sub-sets make the system more
easily manageable. The set is broken down into
mutually exclusive sets. This method will allow
the intrusion detection algorithm to be much
more efficient. An index for a series of char-
acteristics can be represented by Xi, where Xi
is a vector containing p vectors and p is always
greater than 1. Intrusion detection can then be
realized by the following change-point relation:
Xi ≈
{
Np(0,0) i ≤ 
Np(1,1) i >  (9)
where  is the position of attacks,  is the mean
value, and is the nonsingular covariance. Each
time the system changes (i.e. an attack is made)
















and k is the position of the change. The test
statistic is represented by T2, which can be re-
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k,max, (k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1) (14)
For the covariance probability change of mean
value, the variable H0: o = 1, is used for hy-
pothesis testing. The test statistic then becomes
realized by the following relation:
G∗ = −2 log() =∑(ni − 1) log |ˆi||ˆpooled|
(15)
Where is calculated by the following relation:
 = |ˆ0|
k
2 × |ˆ1| n−k2
|ˆ| n2 (16)
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Where ˆ is the prediction of . If the expected
value, as well as the variance, have both been
found to change, then 0 = 1 and 0 = 1.
Although this has been found to perform well in
detecting intrusions under experimental analy-
sis, its reliable performance on the market is yet
to be confirmed.
3.7. Dirichlet Reputation Model [31]
As cloud computing becomes more popular,
more uses for the service are going to be devel-
oped. A newly found use for cloud computing
is contained within services which require users
to transfer information among one another. The
fact that the users of most of these services do
not know the user to which they are sending
information gives rise to many more security
concerns than before. Concerns give rise to fear
when users must transfer valuable information
such as social security numbers, bank account
numbers, etc. In order to make cloud comput-
ing services appeal more to users, trust must be
established between users and service providers
[31].
Figure 12. Dirichlet reputation model [32].
One possible solution to resolve the very impor-
tant security issues is the integration of a system
known as the Dirichlet reputation, as shown in
Figure 12. This system is implemented in order
to observe the behavior of all users participating
in a particular service. Basically, users estab-
lish trust by interacting with other users in an
acceptable manner. If the Dirichlet reputation
system discovers that a user is behaving suspi-
ciously or unacceptably, then the user will be
punished and possibly not allowed to partici-
pate in the cloud computing service. A physical
value is assigned to each user which represents
their reputation. This value is calculated based
upon several factors which are weighted dif-
ferently and of course can change with user
behavior. The reputation value consists of a
first-hand reputation and a second-hand repu-
tation. The first-hand reputation is recognized
by a direct observation of the user whereas the
second-hand reputation is acquired by sharing
of the first-hand reputation among other users.
Each user participating in the service must re-
port a trust value for each other user with whom
they communicate when a second-hand reputa-
tion is acquired.
To illustrate the Dirichlet reputation, consider
two users, 1 and 2, participating in a cloud com-
puting service. Suppose that user 1 examines
some mischievous behavior such as the spread
of a virus by user 2. The behavior of user 2
is assumed to follow the Dirichlet distribution
with a probability of F12. Dir() is designated
as the Dirichlet distribution with  representing
a vector of real numbers greater than 0. This
probability distribution function is used to cal-
culate the first-hand reputation. Bayes’ theorem
is used to compute this reputation and the typi-
cal representation is shown below.
P(i|D) = P(D|i)P(i)P(D)
= Dir(i|i1 + Ni1 · · ·iri + Niri)
(17)
In the above relation, D represents new data
which is provided by user 1 and N represents
instantaneous occurrences of new data. The
Dirichlet reputation system recognizes only three
possible types of behavior: friendly, selfish,
and malicious denoted as 1, 2, and 3 re-
spectively. Observed sent or received packets
can be realized mathematically by the following
two relations





where k represents the number of parameters
under examination within the distribution func-
tion Dir() which, in this particular example,
is always equal to 3.
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Figure 13. General procedure for calculation of
reputation and trust values [32].
In addition to the reputation values calculated
using the relations in (14) – (16), the Dirichlet
reputation system also implements a trust value
(Figure 13). The trust value is used to reflect
how trustworthy user reports are of other users.
Like the reputation values, the trust values are
computed using Bayes’ theorem but only two
possible outcomes can result, trustworthy or not
trustworthy. The probability distribution func-
tion used to calculate trust values is a special
case of the Dirichlet distribution known as the
Beta distribution. The trust value representing
the trust that user 1 has for user 2 is denoted
as T12 ∼ Beta( , ) where  represents trust-
worthy and  represents not trustworthy. When
users start out in a cloud computing service,
 = 1 and  = 1 to establish a starting point.
Each time a trustworthy report is made for a
user, the trust value for that user changes as
 =  + 1 and each time a non-trustworthy re-
port is made for a user, the trust value for that
user changes as  =  + 1. The trust value that
user 1 establishes for user 2 is realized mathe-
matically by the following relation:
12 = Expectation(Beta( , )) =  + 
(19)
The overall, total reputation value used for eval-
uation is calculated by blending reports from all
users in an environment. An illustration show-
ing the general procedure by which the Dirich-
let reputation system implements reputation and
trust values is shown in Figure 13.
3.8. Anonymous Bonus Point System [32]
In the current fast-paced world and with cloud
computing technologies on the rise, integration
of these services with mobile devices has be-
come a necessity [32]. Users now demand mo-
bile serviceswithwhich they can conduct a busi-
ness, make a purchase, engage in the stock mar-
ket, or participate in other services that require
valuable information to be transferred. These
services operate using complex communication
schemes and involve multiple nodes for data
transfer. Often, while participating in cloud
computing services, users must transfer infor-
mation to and from individuals or groups whom
they do not know. This, of course, presents a
situation that is difficult to account for when de-
signing cloud computing security. These types
of service systems are especially susceptible to
attacks simply because it is easy for attackers to
gain access and very difficult for them to be de-
tected and identified. Nonetheless, if designers
of these mobile cloud computing services are
clever with their security schemes, then attack-
ers can be deterred. A cloud computing service
implementing mobile users, along with a pro-
posed security scheme, will now be examined
under the context of a personal digital assistant.
Consider a network of three mobile devices
(personal digital assistants) capable of com-
municating with each other over a distance on
the order of three hundred to four hundred feet.
These three devices will be denoted by UserA,
UserB, and UserC. Assuming that all of these
devices have access to the cloud, data can be
transferred from one user to another on a multi-
hop basis (passing along information one user
at a time). This method conserves much energy
and prevents the cloud from becoming cluttered.
Since users must donate energy from their de-
vices in order to serve other users, each occur-
rence of a donation results in credit toward the
donating user which may later be exchanged for
something of monetary value. Now that the ba-
sic idea is clear, consider a more complex and
more practical situation involving six users of
a particular cloud computing service capable of
communicating with each other over a distance
of several miles. These users will be denoted as
u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, and u6. Consider an exam-
ple situation where user six, u6, has requested
information from the cloud. Figure 13 shows
how this information is transferred to u6 using
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a multi-hop communication system. The fig-
ure shows all possible paths in this particular
network from the cloud to u6. The numbers
between each node represent the credit values
passed along to each intermediate user. How-
ever, in this particular system credits can only be
awarded if the information reaches the intended
recipient.
This system certainly has flaws and drawbacks
including speed and efficiency, but the most
concerning drawback is security. Ordinary cloud
services provide means to examine where and
who information came from. However, due to
high susceptibility to attacks, this particular sys-
tem keeps this type of information confidential.
To achieve confidentiality two primary methods
are used. For one method, the sender of infor-
mation is kept anonymous to every user except
the recipient. Still, even then, the recipient must
request identification from the sender. For the
other method, the sender uses an alias so that all
parties involved can know where the informa-
tion came from, but cannot view the true identity
of the sender. Both of these methods prevent
others from knowing who is sending informa-
tion, and thus where to look to find valuable
information. Another important security issue
involves users’ saved data. Often in cloud com-
puting services, users are required to construct
profiles where personal information is stored
which obviously attracts attackers. This system
prevents these kinds of attacks on devices (per-
sonal digital assistants in this case) by allocat-
ing IP and MAC addresses to each device. This
method would at least prevent any unauthorized
access to information. In order to compete in
the cloud computing market, service providers
must put every effort into ensuring a safe and
secure network.
3.9. Network Slicing [33]
Although a recent endeavor, cloud computing
has proved to be a very useful and very conve-
nient means of providing services. However, as
with most other new products, there are many
aspects of cloud computing which need to be
improved. One particular cloud computing as-
pect that is of concern is the fact that one sin-
gle consumer, depending on their service, may
have the ability to occupy more than their share
of the useful bandwidth. This is obviously a
major problem since the cloud computing ser-
vice providers are trying to make a profit. In
developing a scheme to essentially multiplex
customers, security becomes more complex and
more important. Basically, the task at hand is to
conserve our resources, which in this case is the
bandwidth of a cloud computing network. A
possible solution to this problem proposed here
is to utilize virtual machines in order to “slice”
the network for bandwidth conservation. This
is somewhat of a newly found method and little
study and testing have been conducted in this ef-
fort. Each user would install a group of virtual
machines on their computer, while being able
to use a wide range of operating systems. A
virtual machine is used for each specific cloud
computing service so the number of virtual ma-
chines a user must install is dependent upon the
number of services they request. The setup of
this virtual machine usage is somewhat simple
and may be thought of as an information relay.
An illustration of this setup is shown in Figure
14.
Figure 14. Setup of virtual machine network slicing [33].
The hypervisor serves as a control mechanism
which interfaces the operating system and the
hardware. The domains represent different users,
thus information is passed from one virtual ma-
chine to the next. The host driver then com-
municates with the hardware to perform the re-
quested tasks. It is also suggested to imple-
ment a transmission control protocol mecha-
nism. Within the hypervisor, bridges can be
used to route information to outside sources.
Rather than slicing the network by prioritizing
packets, this system slices the network by im-
plementing a schedule. The scheduling scheme
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seems to provide a more balanced network.
As traffic in the network fluctuates, the sched-
uler makes adjustments to accommodate these
changes. Suppose that a particular set of “n”
host users owns a number of virtual machines.
Let the following relation represent a vector
containing these users.
Gi = {A1,A2,A3,A4, . . . ,An} (20)
Furthermore, suppose that each user has “m”
virtual machines installed on their computer.
Let the following equation represent a vector
containing these machines.
Ai = {V1,V2,V3,V4, . . . ,Vm} (21)
If information is transferred to or from one of the
users, then the information would likely travel
through (m− 1) ∗ n virtual machines. For this
reason, security in this system must be near
flawless. In order for this network slicing sys-
tem to be effective, every possiblemeasure must
be taken to prevent malicious attacks. There is
much work to be done to improve this system,
but the payoff would certainly be worth the ef-
fort.
3.10. Discussions on Cloud Computing
Privacy [29-36]
In the above discussions, five security propos-
als have been examined and discussed in de-
tail including the effects that each would have
on the cloud computing industry. Perhaps the
preceding concepts could be used to derive a
new method which could implement the strong
aspects of each of these fives schemes. Se-
curity within cloud computing is far from per-
fect and has recently become a very puzzling
issue to resolve. The complexity with secu-
rity arises because of constant improvement of
attackers’ knowledge and accessibility. Be-
fore cloud computing services become desir-
able, customers must feel safe with their in-
formation transfer. Each proposal previously
under examination has beneficial properties in
their own respect. For example, the first model
described (the privacy model) implements an
economically efficient method while the CP in-
trusion detection system focuses more effort
toward attack prevention. When designing a
security scheme for cloud computing services,
there underlies a dilemma by which security
cannot come at the cost of other desirable as-
pects such as data speed or affordability. To
counter this dilemma, some security schemes
like the Dirichlet Reputation system allow the
user to control the level of security a great
deal. Although some have more than others, all
five aforementioned security schemes each have
very important and valuable concepts. Table 4
displays a list of the main favorable aspects,
or pros, of each of the examined five security
methods.
To combine the benefits these security propos-
als have provided, we propose a hybrid security
solution as follows. First, we group users into
different domains, based on their demands and
the services they need. A network slicing hy-
pervisor serves as a control mechanism. We use
a vector space model to represent domain pro-
files as well as domain member profiles. After
logged on, the members transfer information
which is tracked. Meanwhile, false informa-
tion is continuously generated and mixed with
the tracked information randomly. Security pa-
rameters can be customized by the members.
Privacy
Model
• Provides very strong encryption of information
• Users can easily customize their security parameters
• Provides an organized method which can be implemented easily
CP Intrusion
Detection
• Protects against a wide variety of intrusion schemes
• Provides excellent prevention of attacks
Dirichlet
Reputation
• Provides sophisticated system of checks and balances
• Avoids ability for attackers to adapt
• Provides a great deal of user control
Anonymous
Bonus Point
• Best suited for small distances, thus users are well hidden from attackers
• Credit rewards provide incentive for users to participate
Network
Slicing
• Provides attacker confusion• Conserves network bandwidth
• Fast data rates are easily attainable
Table 4. Pros of cloud computing security strategies.
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Privacy
Model
• Errors and bugs are difficult to find and correct
• Services can become bogged down by distracting information
• System is only preventative, thus it does not protect against aggressive attackers
CP Intrusion
Detection
• Must be updated frequently to confuse attackers
• May erroneously detect and terminate non-intrusive information
Dirichlet
Reputation
• Relies on complicated strategy that is difficult to implement
• User trust yields susceptibility to deceptive customers
• Performance is solely dependent upon user participation
Anonymous
Bonus Point
• Data speed is drastically reduced
• Provides little intrusion protection
• Can only be implemented in wireless applications
Network
Slicing
• Due to the relay structure, protection is unreliable
• Can become expensive when implemented in large networks
Table 5. Cons of cloud computing security strategies.
In information transferring, the system also en-
hances the ability of encountering attacks by an
intrusion detection system based on a strategy
implementing a statistical security model with
characteristics of the network. For each mem-
ber, a Dirichlet reputation index is associated.
With the index of the receiver, every sender can
determine whether to transfer the data or not if
the receiver behaves suspiciously. We will fur-
ther study more details when implementing this
hybrid security proposal in our future works.
Just as each security scheme has its own favor-
able parameters, each scheme also has its own
unfavorable parameters, or downfalls. Because
no cloud computing security method will ever
be free of flaws, an extremely important consid-
eration when designing security schemes must
be to balance the favorable aspects and the unfa-
vorable aspects. Yet, this is certainly more com-
plicated than it may seem at first glance. There
are a number of factors which must be consid-
ered when attempting to balance strong points
and downfalls. For example, a system such as
the CP intrusion detection strategy, which pro-
vides very strong protection against attackers,
must also allow the service to be efficient both
in performance and in cost. Any security sys-
tem developed will inevitably exhibit flaws and
downfalls, but this does not mean that the sys-
tem is not usable. Just as users desire some
specific parameters included with their security
scheme, they also are not concerned about some
of the downfalls. For example, a large corpo-
ration is likely not to be concerned about the
cost of an expensive service if excellent secu-
rity is included whereas an individual is more
likely not to spend as much money on a compa-
rable system. In order to compare strong points
to downfalls of the previously mentioned cloud
computing security schemes, Table 5 displays
a list of the major flaws, or cons, included in
these systems.
The aforementioned security proposals for im-
plementation into cloud computing are some of
the best performing methods in experimental
analysis. Although not perfect, and in some
cases not even thoroughly tested, these security
schemes certainly encompass good solutions to
the major issues within cloud computing secu-
rity. As mentioned before, none of these five
security methods under examination exhibit so-
lutions to all problems, but future work may
include sub-schemes from each of these meth-
ods. Of course one central “template” for de-
veloping cloud computing security schemes is
highly unlikely, so research must include many
different proposals such as the five discussed
previously. Cloud computing is a fairly recent
endeavor and thus, will require time to develop
reasonable and efficient security systems. Se-
curity methods within cloud computing will in-
evitably have to be frequently updated, more so
than security implementations for other appli-
cations, due to ongoing efforts of attackers. The
future of the entire cloud computing industry is
essentially dependent upon security schemes to
provide privacy and protection of users.
4. Conclusions
Cloud computing will be a major power of the
large-scale and complex computing in the fea-
ture. In this paper, we present a comprehen-
sive survey on the concepts, architectures, and
challenges of cloud computing. We provide in-
troduction in details for architectures of cloud
computing in every level, followed by a sum-
mary of challenges in cloud computing, in the
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aspects of security, virtualization, and cost ef-
ficiency. Among them, Security issues are the
most important challenge in the cloud comput-
ing. We survey comprehensively the security
issues and the current methods addressing the
security challenges. This survey provides use-
ful introduction on cloud computing to the re-
searchers with interest in cloud computing.
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